Abstract
of an array of contrast gratings. We varied the stimulus contrast (encoding noise) and orientation 23 variability (integration noise) of the array. Participants adapted near-optimally to changes in 24 encoding noise, but, under increased integration noise, displayed a range of suboptimal behaviours: 25 they ignored stimulus base rates, reported excessive confidence in their choices, and refrained from 26 opting out of objectively difficult trials. These overconfident behaviours were captured by a 27 Bayesian model which is blind to integration noise. Our study provides a computationally 28 grounded explanation of suboptimal cognitive inferences. 29 The question of whether humans make optimal choices has received considerable attention 30 in the neural, cognitive and behavioural sciences. On one hand, the general consensus in sensory 31 psychophysics and sensorimotor neuroscience is that choices are near-optimal. For example, 32 humans have been shown to combine different sources of stimulus information in a statistically 33 near-optimal manner, weighting each source by its reliability (Ernst & On the other hand, psychologists and behavioural economists, studying more cognitive 40 judgments, have argued that human choices are suboptimal (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) . For probabilities (Ackermann & Landy, 2014) , and/or a reluctance to employ costly cognitive 47 resources (Gershman, Horvitz, & Tenenbaum, 2015; Kahneman, 2011) . However, an account of 48 human decision-making that can explain both perceptual optimality and cognitive suboptimality 49 has yet to emerge (Summerfield & Tsetsos, 2015) . 50 Here we propose that resolving this apparent paradox requires recognizing that perceptual 51 and cognitive choices often are corrupted by different sources of noise. More specifically, choices 52 in perceptual and cognitive tasks tend to be corrupted by noise which arises at different stages of 53 the information processing leading up to a choice (Faisal & Wolpert, 2009; Hunt, 2014; Juslin & 54 Olsson, 1997; Ma & Jazayeri, 2014) . In perceptual tasks, experimenters typically manipulate noise 55 arising before or during sensory encoding. For example, they may vary the contrast of a grating, 56 or the net motion energy in a random dot kinematogram, which affects the signal-to-noise ratio of 57 the encoded stimulus and in turn the sensory percept. Conversely, in cognitive tasks, which often 58 involve written materials or clearly perceptible stimuli, experimenters typically seek to manipulate 59 noise arising after stimulus encoding. For example, they may vary the discrepancy between 60 different pieces of information bearing on a choice, such as the relative costs and benefits of a 61 consumer product (Kahneman, 2011) . These types of judgment are difficult because they require 62 integration of multiple, sometimes highly discordant, pieces of information within a limited- Here we test the hypothesis that, while humans are sensitive to noise arising during early 66 sensory encoding, they are blind to the additional noise introduced by their own cognitive system 67 when integrating variable or discordant pieces of information. We tested this hypothesis using a 68 novel psychophysical paradigm which separates, within a single task, these two types of noise. In 69 particular, observers were asked to categorise the average tilt of an array of gratings. We 76 optimality gap which hinge on task differences. To pre-empt our results, we show that, while 77 observers adapt near-optimally to increases in encoding noise, they fail to adapt to increases in 78 integration noise. We argue that such "noise blindness" is a major driver of suboptimal inference 79 and may explain the gap in optimality between perceptual and cognitive judgments.
80

Results
81
Experimental dissociation of encoding noise and integration noise 82 All six experiments were based on the same psychophysical task (see Methods). On each 83 trial, participants were presented with eight tilted gratings organized in a circular array. 84 Participants were required to categorise the average orientation of the array as oriented clockwise 85 (CW) or counter-clockwise (CCW) from the horizontal axis (Fig. 1A-B) . After having made a In Experiments 1 (n = 20) and 2 (n = 20), we assessed the effects of contrast and variability 93 on choice accuracy and evaluated participants' awareness of these effects. In both experiments, at 94 the beginning of a trial, we provided a "prior" cue which, on half of the trials, signalled the correct 95 stimulus category with 75% probability (henceforth "biased" trials), and, on the other half of trials, 96 provided no information about the stimulus category (henceforth "neutral" trials) (Fig. 1B) . The 97 neutral trials provided us with a baseline measure of participants' choice accuracy in the different 98 conditions of our factorial design, and the biased trials allowed us to assess the degree to which -99 if at all -participants compensated for reduced choice accuracy in a given experimental condition 100 by relying more on the prior cue. In Experiment 2, to provide additional insight into participants' 101 awareness of their own performance, we also asked participants to report their confidence in the 102 choice (i.e. the probability that a choice is correct; Fig. 1C allowed us to compare participants' behaviour under distinct sources of noise: (i) "baseline", (ii) 110 "low-c" and (iii) "high-v". In the baseline condition, the total amount of noise is lowest (high 111 contrast, .6; zero variability, 0º). In the low-c condition (low contrast, .15; zero variability, 0º), 112 encoding noise is high but integration noise is low. Conversely, in the high-v condition, integration 113 noise is high but encoding noise is low (high contrast, 0.6; high variability, 10º). As expected, show a "contrast" trial.
134
Do people utilise the prior cue to compensate for increased errors? 135 We next leveraged the biased trials to assess the degree to which participants adapted to 136 the changes in choice accuracy induced by our factorial design. Given the above results, we would 137 expect participants to rely more on the prior cue in the low-c and the high-v condition than in the 
173
Are people blind to integration noise? 174 To test whether participants failed to adapt because they were "blind" to integration noise, 175 we analysed the confidence reports elicited in Experiment 2 (Fig. 1C) . We implemented a strictly- 176 proper scoring rule such that it was in participants' best interest (i) to make as many accurate 177 choices as possible and (ii) to estimate the probability that a choice is correct as accurately as We focus on an "omniscient" model, which has perfect knowledge of the task structure and 233 how sensory data is generated, and two suboptimal models which propose different mechanistic 234 explanations of participants' lack of sensitivity to the performance cost associated with stimulus The omniscient model has, for each experimental condition, a pair of functions that specify 268 the probability density over sensory data given a CW and a CCW stimulus, taking into account 269 both encoding and integration noise. As the model can identify the current condition (e.g., knows
with certainty that a trial is drawn from the high-contrast, high-variability condition), it only uses 271 the relevant pair of density functions to compute the probability of the observed sensory data given 272 a CCW and a CW category (Fig. 4C) . On neutral trials, each category is equally likely, and the 273 agent computes the probability that a stimulus is CW and CCW directly from the density functions.
274
On biased trials, the categories have different prior probabilities, and the agent scales the density 275 functions by the prior probability of each category as indicated by the prior cue (Fig. 4D) . After 276 having calculated the probability that a stimulus is CW and CCW, the agent can compute a choice 277 (i.e. chose the category with the higher posterior probability) and confidence in this choice (i.e. all variability conditions, but, critically, these density functions do not take into account the 304 additional noise induced by stimulus variability. Because of these differences in the internal model 305 used for Bayesian inference, the models differ in the degree of confidence in a choice for a given 306 sensory data (Fig. 4F) and, by extension, the influence of the prior cue on choice on biased trials.
307
In support of our hypothesis, the noise-blind model provided the best fit to our data. First, the indicates that participants neglected integration noise altogether.
321
Participants are noise blind and not variability blind 322 To further rule out the hypothesis that participants were simply unable to discriminate the 323 variability conditions as proposed by the variability-mixer model, we ran Experiment 4 (n = 24). Fig. 6A-B) .
336
In Experiments 1-4, the experimental conditions were interleaved across trials, which may 337 have made it too difficult for participants to separate the different sources of noise in play. To test 338 the generality of our results, we ran Experiment 5 (n = 24) in which either the contrast or variability 339 level were kept constant across a block of trials ( Fig. 6C-D (Fig. S3) . For example, the 368 model predicts faster RTs on high-variability than low-variability trials, a prediction which is at 369 odds with our observation of slower RTs on high-variability trials.
370
Noise blindness cannot be explained by subsampling 371 We have proposed that stimulus variability impairs performance because of noise inherent 372 to cognitive integration of variable or discordant pieces of information. An alternative explanation which is at odds with our data (Fig. S4A) . If integration noise is introduced, then most, if not all, 394 items would have to be sampled to account for the data. (Table S2) . We note that subsampling, even if an auxiliary cause of integration noise, cannot 399 without further assumptions (e.g. blindness to the performance cost) explain participants' lack of 400 sensitivity to the performance cost associated with high-variability stimuli. This noise blindness gave rise to two common signatures of suboptimality often found in cognitive 408 studies: base-rate neglect and overconfidence. 409 We provided several lines of evidence for our hypothesis. When stimulus variability was 410 high, participants were overconfident, as indicated by cue usage, subjective confidence reports as 411 well as opt-in responses, even though they received trial-by-trial feedback, and even when stimulus 412 variability was salient (Exp1-3), accurately categorised (Exp4) or constant across a block of trials 413 (Exp5). These findings indicate that, while participants were able to track stimulus variability, they 414 simply neglected the performance cost associated with high-variability stimuli. We also ruled out 415 that such noise blindness was due to participants only sampling a subset of a stimulus array (Exp6).
416
The best model of our data assumed that participants sampled all items and were blind to the 417 additional noise inherent to cognitive integration of variable or discordant pieces of information. Blindness to these sources of choice variability, however, predicts systematic overconfidence, 448 which may manifest itself as a lack of sensitivity to base-rate information, for example. In short, 449 suboptimality can arise not only from having the "wrong" model of the task but also from having 450 the "wrong" model of oneself. 451 We do not know why humans are blind to integration noise. One possibility is that basing 452 decision strategies on all sources of noise would prolong deliberation and thus reduce reward rates, 453 or that recognising one's own cognitive deficiencies requires a much longer timeframe. However, Competing interests 471 The authors declare no financial or non-financial competing interests. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were presented with a cue to the prior probability of 502 each stimulus category. The cue was presented 700 ms before the onset of the stimulus array and 503 remained on the screen until a response was registered. An "N" indicated that the two stimulus 504 categories were equally likely, an "R" indicated a 75% probability of a CW stimulus and an "L" 505 indicated a 75% probability of a CCW stimulus. Half of the blocks contained neutral trials ("N") 506 and the other half contained biased trials ("R" or "L"). The blocks were randomised across an 507 experiment. In Experiment 2, after having made a choice, participants were required to indicate 508 the probability that the choice is correct by moving a sliding marker along a scale (50% to 100% 509 in increments of 1%). In Experiment 3, on half of the blocks, participants could opt out of making 510 a choice and receive the same reward as for a correct choice with a 75% probability. There was no 511 prior cue. In Experiment 4, after having made a choice, participants had to categorize (high vs. Computational modelling 536 We first describe the omniscient model who takes into account encoding and integration 537 noise and can identify which condition a trial is drawn from (i.e. assigns a probability of 1 to the 538 current condition on a given trial). We then describe the variability-mixer model, who takes into 539 account integration noise but cannot distinguish the variability conditions (i.e. assigns equal 540 probability to all variability conditions on a given trial), and the noise-blind model, who entirely 541 neglects integration noise. For completeness, we ran six additional models which varied an agent's 542 awareness of encoding noise and/or ability to discriminate contrast conditions. We only discuss 543 these models in the Supplementary Information as they had no support in the empirical data. 544 We modelled -regardless of the model -an agent's noisy estimate, , of the true average where is the agent's total level of noise (encoding plus integration noise) in an experimental 549 condition (see below for noise estimation). 550 We assumed that an omniscient agent's internal model has, for each condition, a unique 551 pair of category-conditioned probability density functions (PDFs) over sensory data, which reflect 552 the total level of noise and the true probability distribution over average orientations (see Fig. 4C 553 for an example We assumed that an agent -regardless of the model -would compute the probability of 564 each category using Bayes' theorem:
where Ρ( | , ) is computed using the relevant PDFs and p( ) is the prior probability of 568 the category in question as indicated by the prior cue. If the category in question is CW, then the 569 alternative category, 0C1 is CCW, and vice versa. On neutral trials, the prior probability of each 570 category is 50%. On biased trials, the prior probability of one category is 75% and the prior 571 probability of the other category is 25%. The computation detailed in eq. 3 can be thought of as 572 scaling the relevant PDFs by the prior probability of the respective category (see Fig. 4D for an 573 example).
574
Finally, we assumed that an agent -regardless of the model -makes a decision, , by 575 selecting the category with higher posterior support and computes confidence in this decision as:
(eq. 4) 578 which in our task is directly given by the posterior probability of the chosen category.
579
Because an omniscient agent takes into account encoding and integration noise and knows 580 which experimental condition a trial is drawn from, she will (i) be appropriately influenced by the 581 prior cue, (ii) accurately estimate the probability of having made a correct choice, and (iii) opt out 582 of trials when she believes that she is less than 75% likely to be correct. We now describe two 583 models which relax the "omniscient" assumptions. 584 We first consider a variability-mixer agent who is sensitive to integration noise but cannot 585 distinguish the different variability conditions. Therefore, when estimating the probability of the 586 sensory data given a CW and a CCW category, the variability-mixer marginalizes its estimate over overlapping than under either of the two other models (Fig. 4E) and a noise-blind agent would 597 therefore tend to hold stronger posterior beliefs (i.e. steeper curves for Fig.4F ). Such stronger 598 posterior beliefs will lead a noise-blind agent to (i) be less influenced by the prior cue than needed,
599
(ii) overestimate the probability of having made a correct choice, and (iii) not opt out of trials when 600 being less than 75% likely to be correct. 601 We note that the models make the same predictions about choice on neutral trials but are 602 distinguishable when focusing on (i) biased trials and (ii) confidence and opt-in behaviour on both 603 neutral and biased trials. Our modelling approach allowed us to calculate a choice probability for 604 each trial under a given model. For model analyses requiring a categorical choice (e.g., logistic 605 regression), we sampled choices according to these choice probabilities.
606
Noise estimation 607 We assumed that each experimental condition was affected by Gaussian noise with a specific 608 standard deviation, /345 . We assumed that encoding noise depends upon the contrast of the array 609 and that integration noise is proportional to the variability of orientations in the array. We estimated 610 the total level of noise for each condition using four free parameters (three for Experiments 4-6). Psychometric fits 639 We fitted psychometric curves to the average proportion of clockwise choices using a four- for Experiments 2-6.
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In Experiment 1, a fixation dot first appeared at the centre of the screen for 300 ms to 763 announce the start of a trial. The fixation dot was replaced by a cue which appeared 700 ms before 764 the stimulus array and which remained on the screen until a response was registered. The cue 765 determined the prior probability of each stimulus category ("L": prior probability of CCW is 75%; 766 "N": CCW and CW equally likely; "R": prior probability of CW is 75%). The stimulus array was 767 shown for 150 ms and was followed by an up-to 3000 ms long response window. Participants appeared at the centre of the screen for 3000 ms, and the next trial was automatically started.
773
The stimulus was composed of eight gratings displayed within a circular array. We half of the blocks, the opt-out option was not available. On the other half of the blocks, the opt-out 821 option was available. Block order was randomised across an experiment and across participants.
822
There was no prior cue.
823
In Experiment 4, we asked participants to categorise either the contrast (rmc = {.15, .60}) the other half of blocks, the cue varied between "L" or "R" in a trial-by-trial manner (biased trials).
837
Block order was randomised across an experiment and across participants. for a trial type, the prior cue varied between "L" or "R" in a trial-by-trial manner (biased trials).
845
The experiment consisted of 1200 trials, distributed into 32 blocks of 40 trials each. Block order 846 was randomised across an experiment and across participants.
847
In Experiment 6, we varied the set-size of the stimulus array. In particular, the stimulus Category-conditioned probability density functions for an omniscient agent 874 We assumed that an omniscient agent's internal model has, for each experimental 875 condition, a unique pair of category-conditioned probability density functions (PDFs) over sensory 876 data. An example of a full set of PDFs are shown in Fig. S1 . Note that the PDFs look more skewed 877 in conditions with low noise (top-left in Fig. S1 ) as they will more closely resemble the true 878 distribution of average orientations (Fig. 4A) . calibrated in the baseline condition (Fig S2) . assumed that lower contrast led to a lower mean of the drift-rate and that higher variability led to 929 higher variance of the drift-rate. The base drift-rate was proportional to the absolute difference 930 between the average orientation and horizontal. We implemented these mechanisms using three for the different conditions (Fig. S3A) , but it predicts a pattern of response times with respect to 940 stimulus variability opposite to what we observed (Fig. S3B) . As a sanity check, we show that 941 higher evidence strength (i.e. absolute deviation of the average orientation from the category 942 boundary) indeed increases choice accuracy and fastens response times (Fig. S3C-F) . First, we found no effect of set-size on accuracy in Experiment 6 (Fig. S4A) (Fig. S4A) . We note that another prediction for Experiment 6 is that accuracy should 985 be higher on eight-item than four-item trials because encoding noise could be averaged out over 986 more items. However, the data does not support this prediction. One possibility is that there is a 
